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Abstract 
During 1965-66, a great power struggle engulfed Chinese politics while the Vietnam War escalated. While most 
scholars study this period for the Cultural Revolution Mao launched, this research proposes to examine the role the 
Vietnam War played in China’s political power struggle. Specifically, my research will show how Mao used the issue 
of Vietnam to defeat his rivals and consolidate power. The Chinese political structure has changed considerably 
since the mid-1970s. Yet, current President Xi Jinping has attempted to purge rivals and consolidate power during 
his term in office. Given this largely successful attempt, I want to know the extent to which Xi has the power to 
personally dictate how to handle problems along China’s periphery. This question is important because China is 
becoming a world class naval power, has an ever-growing economy, and has the potential to become a hegemon in 
Southeast Asia. This research compares the Vietnam War’s impact on Chinese politics during 1965-66 with Xi 
Jinping’s contemporary anti-corruption campaign. Specifically, I use Causal-Process tracing to compare and 
contrast consolidation of power under Mao and current President Xi Jinping. I draw from primary government 
sources of the time period, but also employ secondary sources to contrast them with each other. The results of this 
study finds that the PLA was the dominant source of strength for both Mao and Xi. Additionally, both Mao and Xi’s 
wives played critical roles in their success. Furthermore, the creation of new organizations helped both Mao and Xi 
circumvent the Party apparatus when they needed to further consolidate their personal authority. Current 
indications suggest that Xi Jinping is attempting to hold onto power for the foreseeable future, even after his 
expected retirement in the year 2023. 
Introduction 
China has a long and colorful history of stories regarding power and politics. This article focuses on two 
individuals from two important time periods who consolidated power: Mao Zedong during the mid-1960s and 
China’s current President Xi Jinping. Mao consolidated power from 1965-1966, just as the Vietnam War started to 
escalate. Xi has rapidly consolidated power from the time he took over as president in November of 2012.1 China’s 
leadership moved away from a strong man rule after Mao’s death in 1976, to a government led by a collective group 
of leaders. Between 1992 and 2012, no individual dramatically stood out from the rest. However, China has turned 
again to strong man rule since Xi has taken power.2 Because of the change, this article explores the potential 
political, economic, and social changes that might result from the shift toward strong man rule. This is important for 
numerous reasons. China’s sheer physical and economic size, as well as its geographical location, render Chinese 
geopolitics more influential than any other Asian country. Furthermore, China is building a world class navy,3 and 
                                                          
1  Zheng Yongnian and Lance L. P. Gore, China Entering the Xi Jinping Era (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2014), 1, accessed 
May 27, 2015, <http://public.eblib.com/choice/PublicFullRecord.aspx?p=1864786> See also Joseph Fewsmith. "Xi Jinping’s fast 
start." China Leadership Monitor no.41 (2013): 3-4, accessed June 3, 2015, http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/748504/xi-
jinpings-fast-start.pdf  
2  Willy Lam, Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping: Renaissance, Reform, or Retrogression? (Routledge: 2015), 7, accessed 
May 20, 2015, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=966034 see also 
Elizabeth Economy, "China’s Imperial President." Foreign Affairs 93, no. 6 (2014): 80-91, accessed May 28, 2015, http://sites. 
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3  Robert Kaplan, Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (New York: Random House, 2014), 14. 
See also Jeremy Page and Rob Taylor, "Deep Threat: China’s Submarines Add Nuclear-Strike Capability, Altering Strategic 
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its economy has become critical to the global economy.4 Because of these characteristics, anything that happens to 
China in the future will certainly have an impact on the rest of the world.  
I employ a case-oriented qualitative comparison to explore how both Mao and Xi consolidated power in 
this study. The main variables I use to explain consolidation of power include: international crises, economic 
conditions, leadership qualities, corruption, and control of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The results of my 
analysis demonstrate that leadership qualities and control of the PLA proved to be important for both Mao and Xi’s 
consolidation of power. Additionally, I employ a historical timeline analysis of events to assist in identifying the 
causal factors that are important for both Mao and Xi’s consolidation of power. I argue that two causal factors were 
important for both Mao and Xi. (1) Both Mao and Xi’s wives played critical roles in their success and (2) both Mao 
and Xi established new organizations to sidestep existing power structures and build more personal authority. The 
first section of the article provides the background to the research question. Next, I describe the variables I use and 
explain why they played an important role for both Mao and Xi. Next, I provide historical analysis that highlights 
additional causal factors for both Mao and Xi’s ability to consolidate power. Finally, I summarize the results of my 
analysis and address potential implications for China.  
Background 
1962 
Li Zhisui—Mao’s personal physician—described 1962 as a turning point in Mao’s political life.5 That 
turning point began in January, at the seven thousand cadre’s conference—so named as a meeting of the top seven 
thousand officials from across the country. The previous three years were a tumultuous period for the Chinese 
Communist leadership. In 1959, Mao relinquished his post as head of state to Liu Shaoqi. Liu was Mao’s 
handpicked successor, and the number two man in China behind Mao. Although Mao remained chairman of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Great Leap Forward (GLF) damaged his credibility. The GLF from 1958-1961 
is a dark hole in China’s history that the CCP still does not acknowledge. Estimates vary, but most scholars agree 
the death toll is anywhere between 30-45 million people—most of the deaths occurred from a great famine that it 
produced.6  Mao started the GLF to accelerate the economy and catch up with the West, but it resulted in disaster. 
Mao blamed the results on the weather conditions. 
The CCP—and the country—is run by the handful of men that make up the Political Bureau Standing 
Committee (PBSC). Usually consisting of 7-9 members, it is led by the general secretary, or chairman during Mao’s 
time, who is the president of China and leader of the party. From 1962-1966, the members consisting of the PBSC 
were Mao (who was chairman of the Party), Liu Shaoqi (head of state), Deng Xiaoping (general secretary of the 
party), Zhou Enlai (premier), Lin Biao (Minister of Defense), Chen Yun, and Zhu De.7 Liu Shaoqi and Deng 
Xiaoping were trying to right the ship after the tragedy of the GLF, which meant opposing Mao’s disastrous 
domestic policies. Liu gave a speech criticizing GLF policies at the seven thousand cadre’s conference, which, in 
essence, was a criticism of Mao.8 More importantly, Mao offered a self-criticism at this conference.9 Mao had 
become an immortal figure, and this self-criticism was a shock to many people. Philip Short writes, “Minimal 
though it was, Mao’s acknowledgement of liability electrified the meeting. He did not need to say more: in a Party 
                                                          
Balance." Wall Street Journal October 24 2014, accessed May 24, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-submarine-fleet-
adds-nuclear-strike-capability-altering-strategic-balance-undersea-1414164738. 
4   Justin Yifu Lin, “China and the Global economy” accessed July 22, 2015, http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/ 
Lin.pdf. See also Jonathan Fenby. Tiger Head, Snake Tails: China Today, How It Got There, and Where It Is Heading (New 
York: Overlook, 2012), 4-5. 
5   Li, Zhisui, and Anne F. Thurston, The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao's Personal Physician. (New York: 
Random House, 1994), 385. 
6   Frank Dikotter puts the figure at 45 million, or possibly even more, in his account of the Great Leap Forward, Mao's Great 
Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-1962 (New York: Walker & Co, 2010)  
7   Roderick Macfarquhar, The Politics of China, 1949-1989, Appendix 2 (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 535.  
8   “Factionalism in the Central Committee: Mao’s opposition since 1949” CIA Caesar, Polo and Esau documents. (May, 2007): 
21, accessed June 20, 2015, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/14/polo-23.pdf.  
9   Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, 387. 
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which had learned to regard him as infallible, it was extraordinary enough for him to admit to any failings at all.”10 
Furthermore, Mao did not have plans on stopping the campaign of the Great Leap Forward.11 Liu’s speech caught 
Mao off guard, and more importantly, Liu’s speech was supported by the majority of cadres in attendance. The top 
officials throughout China expressed their disapproval of Mao’s policies.12 A bitter experience, this triggered a 
counterattack that would begin later in the year. After this conference, Mao increasingly became dissatisfied with 
Liu Shaoqi and the rest of the leadership. Mao retreated to Hangzhou for the spring and summer to prepare his 
counterattack, leaving the leadership and operation of the CCP to Liu, Deng, and Zhou Enlai.  
Jiang Ching—Mao’s fourth wife—made her first public appearance in a meeting with the wife of 
Indonesia’s President Sukarno in September.13 Jiang Ching is an important figure in the power struggle between 
Mao and Liu, and played a prominent role in Chinese politics during this time. Additionally, the American presence 
in South Vietnam had grown by the end of 1962. There were a little over three thousand military advisors at the end 
of 1961. That number increased to over nine thousand by the end of 1962.14 This development would continue to 
play an increasingly important role in Chinese politics. 
1963 
At a Central Work Conference in February, Mao declared the Party had to fight revisionism through class 
struggle. This conference also introduced the ‘Four Clean-Ups’ campaign launched in the rural areas (check 
production team accounts, granaries, housing, and the allocation of work-points).15 After this conference Mao once 
again retreated to see how the leadership implemented his programs. Controversially, Liu Shaoqi made a speech 
titled ‘the second ten points’ that upset Mao shortly after the new programs Mao established.16 Mao was upset 
because Liu deviated from the policies Mao outlined in the SEC. The internal party struggles over policy started to 
rapidly escalate.   
Mao welcomed a delegation from the VWP (Vietnam Worker’s Party) on June 4th.17 During this meeting 
Mao attempted to continue driving a wedge between Hanoi and Moscow. On November 2nd, Ngo Dinh Diem, 
President of South Vietnam, was assassinated in a coup. This escalated events in Vietnam, further sending the 
country on a road to war.  
1964 
An increased amount of aid to North Vietnam was approved in mid-June at a CCP work conference. Zhou 
Enlai led a CCP delegation to Hanoi in July to meet with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and Pathet 
Lao about America escalating its actions in Indochina, and Vietnam in particular.18 A five-man group led by Peng 
Zhen that became the precursor to the Cultural Revolution Group was established in July. Initially, the group was 
established to cleanse the arts and literature of China—people who were not carrying out party policy according to 
Mao.19 Later, Mao used it to help circumvent the power of the Party.  
In the Gulf of Tonkin, an incident occurred on August 2nd which played an important role in triggering a 
full-scale war between the U.S. and North Vietnam. Still highly debated today, an American ship was fired upon by 
a North Vietnamese aircraft. This prompted U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson to carry out airstrikes on North 
Vietnamese naval installations.20 On October 16th, China tested its first nuclear weapon.21 Further south, in Vietnam, 
                                                          
10  Philip Short, Mao: A Life. (New York: Henry Holt, 2000), 511. 
11  Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005), 495.  
12  Chang and Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story, 475-476. 
13  Short, Mao: A Life, 521. 
14  Mark Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History (Oxford University Press, 2010), 72. 
15  Short, Mao: A Life, 517. 
16  Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, 400. 
17  Qiang Zhai. China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 124. 
18  Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975, 131. 
19  Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, 447. 
20  Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History, 86. 
21  Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story, 484. 
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events were rapidly deteriorating. President Johnson began to expand the U.S. military role during the month of 
November. The number of U.S military advisors reached 23,300 by the end of 1964.22  
1965 
Mao began the year launching a personal attack on Liu Shaoqi at a central work conference in January. A 
CIA report described how critical this meeting was by saying, “this party work conference in January 1965 was an 
important milestone on the road to the ‘great proletarian cultural revolution’”.23 On February 7th, troops from North 
Vietnam attacked U.S. bases in South Vietnam around Pleiku, killing eight Americans. Less than a month later, the 
U.S. initiated Rolling Thunder—a sustained bombing campaign of North Vietnam.24 This led to the first U.S. 
Marines arriving in South Vietnam at the DaNang military base on March 8th.25  
Mao sent Jiang Ching to Shanghai in February to prepare attacks on the Party through propaganda 
channels. Zhang Chunqiao, a top Party official in Shanghai, supported Jiang Ching’s endeavors. Zhang helped Jiang 
enlist the services of a writer named Yao Wenyuan. Together with Mao, Jiang and Yao planned an article that would 
be published later in the year to help set off the Cultural Revolution.26 It is important to describe what the Cultural 
Revolution was. China expert Lance Gore explains it this way: 
 
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) that lasted for a decade was a radical movement 
that shut down schools, slowed production, turned people against one another in civil war-like upheavals, 
and virtually severed China’s relations with the outside world. It was proletarian because it was a 
revolution of workers, peasants, and students against party officials. It was cultural because it meant to alter 
the values of society in line with the communist ideology.27 
 
From September to October, an important Party conference took place. One big issue was strategy 
regarding the Vietnam War. This meeting also played an important role in shaping the upcoming Cultural 
Revolution.28 Mao wanted Wu Han criticized. Liu, Deng, Peng Zhen and the rest of the leadership refused, however, 
knowing what might happen as a result. This proved that Mao did not have complete control over the Party and 
would have to maneuver carefully to dispose of his opponents. Furthermore, during this conference, Peng Zhen 
made some defiant remarks that were directed at Mao. Peng said that “‘everyone in the face of truth was equal’ and 
that even Chairman Mao should be criticized.”29 
Simultaneously, events in Vietnam began to further deteriorate. The number of U.S. troops in South 
Vietnam reached 184,300 by the end of 1965.30 China was pressured to support Hanoi, and at the same time their 
relationship with the Soviet Union was at an all-time low. Simultaneously, a sense of being encircled because of the 
growing U.S. military presence in Vietnam was alarming. Additionally, the Chinese economy had still not 
completely recovered from the GLF. Amidst all this, Mao started to take advantage of the growing turmoil in 
Vietnam. From now on, everything would be a sideshow to his goal of completely destroying the Party apparatus 
and removing everyone in his way.  
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25  Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History, 90. 
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27  Lance Gore, Chinese Politics Illustrated: The Cultural, Social and Historical Context (Hackensack NJ: World Scientific, 
2014), 233. 
28  introduction to “Mao’s ‘Cultural Revolution’: Its Leadership, Its Strategy, Its Instruments and Its Casualties” CIA, Caesar, 
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1966 
Lin Biao suggested additional changes were likely at a PLA political work conference in January.31 The 
change Lin had in mind was removing those who were supportive of Liu. Also in January, Mao called together a 
handful of trusted individuals, including his wife Jiang Qing, to form a group that would replace the existing 
Cultural Revolution Group.32 Mao had become greatly angered by Peng Zhen and waited for the right time to oust 
him. The current Cultural Revolution Group under Peng Zhen remained intact for the time being. Peng released a 
report titled the “February Outline Report” that claimed playwrights such as Wu Han and others deserve the freedom 
to write whatever they want to. On February 8th, Peng and the rest of the Cultural Revolution Group flew to Wuhan 
to talk to Mao about the outline. Mao did not absolutely support it, but he did not object to it either.33 At the end of 
March, when Liu Shaoqi left for a state visit to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Burma, Mao decided to strike. After Liu 
left, Mao decided to condemn the “February Outline” and state that it should be repudiated.34 At this point, either 
right before or right after Liu left, Peng Zhen and Lu Ting-yi—director of the propaganda department—were 
arrested.35 This triggered a secretariat meeting from April 9th through the 12th that was presided over by Deng 
Xiaoping. At the meeting Kang Sheng and Chen Boda criticized Peng Zhen. Deng was pressured into joining Zhou 
Enlai, Kang Sheng, and Chen Boda to decide that Peng had wrongly opposed Chairman Mao on some issues and 
should be removed from the Cultural Revolution Group. Following this, Mao called a meeting of the Standing 
Committee on April 16th and had the Cultural Revolution Group disbanded.36  
In May, at a work conference chaired by Mao, it was officially revealed that Peng Zhen had been purged. 
Also, the new Cultural Revolution Group was established. It included Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, and Chen Boda.37 
This new group, led by Jiang Qing, grew more powerful than the Party apparatus. With both Peng Zhen and Lo Rui-
Ching now gone, Mao had the upper hand. On May 18th, Lin Biao talked to the Politburo in secret and claimed that 
Peng Zhen and Lo Rui-Ching had collaborated with a small group of people in an attempted coup against Mao.38  
By June, Liu Shaoqi was no longer in control of the state run newspaper The People’s Daily—which was a 
powerful weapon, and continues to be today.39 On August 1st, Mao called for a Central Committee Plenum. At this 
plenum Liu was demoted. Lin Biao replaced him as deputy leader of the Party. Liu slid from 2nd to 8th in the Party 
hierarchy, but he remained head of state—although at that point it was just a title with no power attached.40  
To the south in Vietnam, the number of U.S. troops in South Vietnam now stood at 385,300—an increase 
of 200,000 soldiers since the end of 1965.41 
1967 
By the end of February, the Politburo stopped functioning. The Standing Committee and Cultural 
Revolution Group, chaired by Premier Zhou Enlai, took over.42 It signaled Mao’s success in defeating the Party 
apparatus. Liu and Deng were subject to trumped up trials, marking their complete fall from power.43 As part of the 
Cultural Revolution Group, Jiang Qing was a key player in the purge of Party officials. Jiang relished seeing Liu and 
Deng humiliated, so humiliated that they would never be able to mount a political comeback. She was right about 
Liu who would pass away in 1969, but a decade later the iron-willed Deng Xiaoping would have the last laugh when 
there would be no Mao to protect her.    
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39  Short, Mao: A Life, 536.  
40  Introduction to “Mao’s ‘Cultural Revolution’: Its Leadership, Its Strategy, Its Instruments and Its Casualties” ibid, ix. 
41  Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History, 102. 
42  Short, Mao: A Life, 562. 
43  Chang and Holliday, Mao: The Unknown Story, 532-533.  
64 
 
1968-2011 
Liu Shaoqi was officially expelled from the Party at a meeting in 1968. Although Liu was expelled from 
the party, Deng Xiaoping was allowed to keep his Party membership. Mao gave Deng an opportunity for hope. It 
was a decision that had a lasting impact, not just for China, but the world. Premier Zhou Enlai passed away on 
January 8, 1976. Zhou had been one of the most beloved Chinese officials of the twentieth century. Later that year, 
Mao Zedong died on September 9th. With the top two Chinese officials dying in the same year, the battle for 
political power began. That battle was won by Deng Xiaoping, who had survived the Cultural Revolution. Mao’s 
wife Jiang Qing and her collaborators were arrested. Charismatic, brilliant, and ruthless, Deng had all the qualities of 
a strong Chinese leader. Deng officially replaced Mao and took over as the leader of the CCP in December of 1978.  
In 1980, Deng started opening up China’s economy to the world. Travel in and out of China also started to 
accelerate; under Mao travel was restricted. Peasants in the countryside were able to do their own private farming 
and individuals were able to begin their own businesses. These were radical changes for the Chinese people. Other 
things stayed the same though, specifically politics.  
The PRC constitution changed in 1982. Two five-year term limits were established for the president, vice-
president, and members of the PBSC. Nobody would be able to rule again indefinitely as Mao had done. Ironically, 
Deng was not the Party secretary during his time in power, but he was still the Party chairman and the paramount 
leader until 1992. Jiang Zemin, the former mayor of Shanghai, replaced Deng. This began a shift in the CCP 
hierarchy from a strong man rule, toward a consolidated leadership with no single individual dominating the Party. 
The 1990s under Jiang saw incredible economic growth in China, but also turbulent relations with Taiwan. 
Hu Jintao replaced Jiang Zemin in 2002. Under Hu, China continued its strong economic growth, and was 
led by a group of leaders with no strong personalities. China’s economy surpassed Japan’s as the world’s second 
largest in 2010.44 It was a symbolic event for China that highlighted its growing power, especially in East Asia. Just 
two decades ago, it would have been thought of as inconceivable. The year 2011 ended shrouded in mystery when 
British businessman Neil Heywood was found dead in a Chongqing hotel on November 11th.   
2012 
As a fast rising Party official, Bo Xilai expected a position on the PBSC in November. Although Bo and Xi 
Jinping were both princelings, they were political competitors for power in the CCP.45 Some CCP leaders in Beijing, 
most notably Premier Wen Jiabo, were openly critical though of the political model Bo established in Chongqing.46 
Bo was a very popular official; his crusade against corruption and revival of Maoism struck a popular nerve among 
people. Bo’s popularity continues to exist among the people of Chongqing, even after his downfall.47 The Party 
removed Bo from all his leadership positions in April, and his wife Gu Kailai was detained on suspicions of killing 
Mr. Heywood.48 The biggest mistake Bo made was embarrassing the CCP.  In August, Gu Kailai admitted to 
murdering Mr. Heywood by poisoning him, and was sentenced to a suspended death sentence.49 To understand just 
how important 2012 was, and specifically, the problems that grew from the murder of Neil Heywood, one should 
read Xiansheng Tian who sums it up saying: 
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The year of 2012 witnessed one of the greatest challenges the Chinese Communist Party had ever 
experienced in its history. The dramatic escape of a powerful police chief, Wang Lijun, from Chongqing 
city and his effort in looking for protection by the American Consulate General in Chengdu, China, 
shocked the whole world as well as the Chinese Communist Party itself.50  
    
Currently there are three different groups that dominate Chinese politics; the princeling faction, CYL 
faction (Communist Youth League) and the Shanghai clique. The princelings are led by current President Xi 
Jinping, the CYL faction by former President Hu Jintao and current Premier Li Keqiang, and the Shanghai clique by 
former President Jiang Zemin. There are times when the groups become blurred and members of one group also 
have ties to a different group. There are scholars who debate that looking at Chinese politics from the perspective of 
these factions is not accurate;51 however, it is the easiest way to understand current Chinese politics. Because of the 
embarrassment caused by Bo, the princeling group took a hit. Xi’s position as the next president of China was not as 
secure as it had been. For a short time, this gave the CYL faction a much needed boost. But then another incident 
occurred right after the Bo Xilai scandal that dealt a blow to the CYL faction. Ling Gu, the son of then director of 
the CCP General Office—a powerful position in the CCP—and close advisor to President Hu, Ling Jihua, was killed 
in a traffic accident. Driving a Ferrari, two of Ling’s girlfriends who were also in the car with him managed to come 
out alive, but both suffered severe injuries.52 The affair exposed the enormous wealth of assets by Ling, and his 
mother Gu Liping. President Hu’s enemies launched attacks on him and the CYL faction. Most notably, Jiang 
Zemin scathingly attacked Hu, blaming him for the failure of looking over his group and keeping them from trouble. 
Hu’s authority and influence took a big hit from this.53 Furthermore, his power at placing his allies in top spots at the 
upcoming leadership change was affected by this.  
Right before Xi was set to become the new president, he went “missing” from September 1st through the 
15th. Among the most apocryphal reasons given was the story that Xi had injured his back swimming;54 the real 
reason was quite different. The prominent China scholar Willy Lam mentions that most likely Xi did it to do 
something unprecedented: “He was using his silence as a protest against what he perceived to be irregularities in 
preparations for the Eighteenth Party Congress, particularly personnel arrangements that were not to his liking.”55 Xi 
wanted to be chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) immediately. When Hu became president, he had 
to wait two years until he became chairman of the CMC, taking over for Jiang Zemin. Xi got his wish, however, at 
the Eighteenth Party Congress in November, thanks in large part to Jiang Zemin. With corruption becoming a major 
problem in China, Xi began to enforce discipline on Party members immediately. Shortly after the Eighteenth Party 
Congress, Xi announced the “Eight Point Regulations against Extravaganza” which were guidelines designed to 
prevent cadres from taking advantage of their status—or in other words, no more openly flaunting their wealth.56 
More importantly, this began Xi’s anti-corruption campaign which was fully implemented the following month.  
2013 
Xi and President Obama held their first summit together in California in June amidst rising concerns about 
cybersecurity and conflict in the South China Sea.57 A year-long rectification campaign also began in June called the 
“Campaign on Mass-Line Education and Practice.”58 This campaign was aimed to establish better relations with the 
people and enforce Party discipline.    
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Xi carried out a considerable power grab in November that enabled him to further consolidate power in 
himself. At a Party conference, two new superagencies were created. The first was the CNSC (Central National 
Security Council) which is supposedly modeled like the U.S. national security council. With authority over all the 
security forces in China, it is a powerful organization. The other organization created was the CLGCDR (Central 
Leading Group on Comprehensively Deepening Reforms) which is tasked with reforming the economy, and also 
pertains to the culture. Xi is chairman of both these new agencies.59  
Zhou Yongkang was the first ‘big tiger’ caught in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign in December when he was 
placed under investigation.60 A retired Chinese official who served on the PBSC under Hu Jintao, Zhou had been in 
charge of the security forces. His power reached far and wide. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were opposed to this 
at first because of Zhou’s stature. Xi however, was able to convince Jiang that Zhou should be removed.61 Zhou had 
also been a close ally of Bo Xilai; therefore, the arrest of Zhou is seen by many as politically motivated. In 2012, 
before Xi came to power, there were rumors that Zhou Yongkang and Bo Xilai had planned a coup against Xi before 
he could assume power. There were also rumors that Zhou personally tried to have Xi killed before and after Xi took 
over.62 This would partially explain why Xi wanted to remove both Bo and Zhou.  
2014 
General Xu Caihou was expelled from the CCP and handed over to prosecutors in June. Xu had been a 
member of the 25-man Politburo—the second highest political group after the PBSC. Xu also served as the vice-
chairman of the CMC.63 From 1999 until 2012, Xu was in charge of promoting high ranking military officials in the 
PLA.64 This indicated that the anti-corruption campaign was beginning to reach high into the military. The 
publication of a book filled with Xi Jinping’s quotes titled The Governance of China came out in October.65 Neither 
the previous two presidents, nor Deng Xiaoping, had a book published filled with their speeches to promote their 
personality. From October 20-23, the Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee met. The focus of the meeting 
was on the rule of law.66 Not in a Western sense, but as a way for Xi to control the Party.   
2015 
The PLA released a list of 14 Generals that were under investigation for corruption in March.67 It is further 
evidence that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign had expanded within the military. It also shows that the PLA is Xi’s 
main base of support. He would not be going after the PLA if he feared a backlash against his corruption campaign 
among the military elite. Zhou Yongkang was sentenced to life in prison for corruption in June.68  
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On July 1st, China approved a sweeping new national security law. The law is vague, but it appears to give 
Xi even more power on national security.69 As Ankit Panda writes, “The Party seems to be coalescing national 
security authority around Xi as an acknowledgement that centralized authority is both in the interest of the Party and 
the country.”70 It is indicative of how complete Xi’s power is in the realm of national security. At the end of July, 
the anti-corruption campaign took down another high ranking military official—Guo Boxiong. Guo, who served as 
vice-chairman of the CMC from 2002-2012—with Xu Caihou—was accused of taking bribes.71 Guo Boxiong and 
Xu Caihou were both high ranking military officials who were promoted by Jiang Zemin. Xi appears to be further 
strengthening his grip on the military by removing Jiang’s men. The next sections of the article focus on the 
variables and how Mao and Xi consolidated personal power. 
International Crises 
The first variable I address to explain power consolidation is international crisis. I use Oran Young’s 
definition of an international crisis: “An International Crisis is a set of rapidly unfolding events which raises the 
impact of destabilizing forces in the general system or has any of its subsystems substantially above ‘normal’ (i.e., 
average) levels and increases the likelihood of violence occurring in the system.”72 China’s leaders from 1964-1966 
faced an international crisis with the escalation of the Vietnam War. Mao’s comments to a delegation of the 
Japanese Communist Party in February of 1966 highlights the seriousness of the Vietnam War’s threat to China. 
Mao elaborated, “A war between China and America is inevitable. This year at the earliest or within two years at the 
latest such a war will occur. America will attack us from four points, namely the Vietnam frontier, the Korean 
frontier, and through Japan by way of Taiwan and Okinawa.”73 But, did it help Mao consolidate power in himself? 
Donald Zagoria claims, “First, it is reasonably clear that American policies in Vietnam served as a catalyst to trigger 
long-standing political divergencies among the Chinese leadership”74 The danger of this time period, and how close 
the U.S. came to carrying out military strikes against China is lucidly explained by Lyle Goldstein who chillingly 
sums up the crisis situation at that time, “US-China crisis interaction during this period witnessed several instances 
when American leaders contemplated the possibility of employing nuclear weapons against China and actively 
considered preventive strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities in the early 1960s.”75 It wasn’t just the Vietnam War 
though that contributed to the international crisis’s that China faced. On September 30, 1965, Sukarno, President of 
Indonesia, was overthrown in a coup by an American supported general named Suharto. Sukarno had ties to the 
countries communist party (PKI) who were supported by Beijing. In addition to a terrible relationship with the 
Soviet Union and the Vietnam War escalating, this setback for Mao further divided the leadership. Edward Rice 
explains, “The series of failures, which culminated in the reversal in Indonesia, undoubtedly widened the split 
between Mao Tse-tung—who had been largely responsible for the direction of external affairs—and his opponents 
in the leadership.”76 
During 1965, the widening split in the leadership gave Mao an opening to consolidate personal power. 
More importantly, it forced Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi to choose sides in the power struggle between Mao and Liu. As 
Harry Harding and Melvin Gurtov mentioned, Lo Jui-Ching and Peng Chen became politically vulnerable after 
Zhou joined the Mao alliance.77 Foreign policy played a big role for Mao in his consolidation of power. It divided 
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the leadership to the point that whoever opposed Mao was exposed. Andrew Wedeman writes that, “Because foreign 
policy became an ideological weapon, it lost its substantive importance and was subsumed under the more general 
debate on domestic topics.”78 It’s also worth examining the timing of when Mao began the Cultural Revolution with 
what was happening externally. Mao began his attack on the Party center not long after American troops started 
pouring into South Vietnam. As Byung-joon Ahn cleverly notes, “Why did Mao raise the Wu Han issue at the 
particular time of September-October 1965, although Wu Han had written his play in 1960 and the play had been 
staged in 1961? Why did he raise the question of revisionism within the Central Committee at the same time?”79 
Certainly one reason is because Mao was in retreat from the Great Leap Forward between 1960 and 1962. But, 
another factor is the Vietnam War which escalated in the spring of 1965. The response on how to respond further 
divided the leadership and gave Mao an opening to attack the Party. Another important factor is worth considering 
though. In a crisis, people look to a strong leader to lead them through the stormy waters. Throughout China’s five 
thousand years of history, people looked to and relied on strong leaders of the long succession of dynasties to protect 
them. For China, during the mid-1960s the Chinese peasants trusted Mao. Additionally, he had already stood up to 
America once before—during the Korean War—with success. With that position, he consolidated power in himself, 
and dusted off his opponents in the process.  
Today, China faces growing tensions in the South China Sea. One of the biggest sources of friction that the 
U.S. and China’s neighbors has with China is the building of islands in the South China Sea. China’s construction of 
airstrips and facilities has raised concerns. Confrontations have risen between China and Vietnam over China 
dragging an oil rig close to the coast of Vietnam.80 Also, China has clashed with the Philippines in the Spratly 
Islands and the Scarborough Shoal—a group of reefs and rocks. The Philippines has sued China over the rights to 
explore for oil and gas 200 miles off the Philippines coast, an area that overlaps with Chinese interests.81 
Meanwhile, tensions are rising between China and Japan.82 While the chance for conflict, or even war, has increased 
over the past five years, it still remains unlikely because of the strong economic interdependence between China and 
Japan, Taiwan, the U.S., and Southeast Asia.83 The geopolitical situation currently is nowhere near as chaotic as it 
was under Mao in the mid-1960s. Xi Jinping is not facing U.S. bombing raids right on his doorstep. Furthermore, 
China is militarily stronger today than under Mao. It helps that China’s neighbors—Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan, 
Malaysia, South Korea, and the Philippines—do not have the military capabilities that China does. So while there 
might be an international crisis in the terms defined by Young, most International Relations scholars would agree 
what we face today is not a crisis in the sense of what it was during the Vietnam War. Possibly the biggest reason 
that the international situation is not contributing to Xi’s consolidation of power is because upon becoming president 
he assumed the title as chairman of the CMC, Party secretary general of the CCP, and head of the CCP Central 
Leading Group on Foreign Affairs. Basically, he has had complete control of foreign policy decision making since 
the moment he became the leader of China. During the mid-1960s Liu Shaoqi was head of state, and Premier Zhou 
Enlai also played a large role in Chinese foreign affairs. There was not a consensus on foreign policy among China’s 
elites during Mao’s time of consolidating power as there is now with Xi. 
Economic Conditions 
This research examines economic factors such as GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and GNI (Gross National 
Income) when examining the economic conditions in China. Although issues such as pollution and quality of living 
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are hot topics today, my focus is on factors that show an overall view of China’s economy. As noted previously, 
China’s economy was in bad condition during the 1960s because of the GLF launched by Mao. By 1965 the 
economy was doing better due to the efforts of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. But, China continued to lag far 
behind most other countries. To illustrate the state of the Chinese economy during the 1960s, below is a graph 
comparing China’s GDP per capita with Cambodia—a country that is a small fraction of the size of China. 
Throughout the 1960s Cambodia had a higher GDP per capita than China until the Vietnam War wreaked havoc on 
Cambodia. Thus, Mao’s consolidation of power from the end of 1965 through 1966 cannot be explained by the 
economy. The economic conditions of the time period do not suggest Mao used the success or deterioration of the 
economy to consolidate power in himself. Furthermore, Mao’s economic policies were why his credibility was 
damaged in the first place. Because of the GLF, Mao went into retreat, enabling Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping to 
take control of the Party apparatus. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Data from database: World Development Indicators. Source: World Bank 
 
After the death of Mao, Deng Xiaoping opened up China’s economy. Incorporating market reforms, the 
Chinese economy took off. In 2014, China overtook the U.S. as the world’s largest economy.84 In just the space of 
three and a half decades, China’s economy has gone from an embarrassment to being the largest economy in the 
world. The Chinese economy has become vital to the world. Jonathan Fenby writes, “The PRC lends more than the 
World Bank to developing nations.”85 But, China still has a long way to go towards being a prosperous country. In 
terms of Gross National Income, China still trails the U.S. by a considerable amount even though China has a 
population that is nearly four times that of the U.S. The chart below demonstrates this discrepancy between the two 
countries. Despite the problems in China’s economy today, Xi had the benefit of taking over at a time when China’s 
economy was performing at a high rate. The challenge for Xi will be to keep the GDP growth at 6% or higher for the 
next decade. In analyzing CCP policies toward the economy, there are no indications that disagreements about 
economic policies helped Xi consolidate personal power. China’s premier is the one typically in charge of economic 
affairs.86 But, Xi has managed to diminish the role of China’s current premier—Li Keqiang—by establishing the 
CLGCDR and making himself the head of the group. The CLGCDR, in vague language, was established to carry out 
reforms and direct policy concerning “economic, political, cultural, social and environmental sectors as well as the 
Party system.”87 It is now the top decision making body with regards to reforming the economy.88 It is unclear if Xi 
did this because of his disapproval of Li’s economic views. Wily Lam notes that there is a difference of opinion 
between Xi and Li on economic policies saying, “Unlike Xi and his conservative colleagues, Li wants the 
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government to curtail direct interference in the economy.”89 Additionally, Xi has further sidelined Li by putting 
himself as head of the Central Leading Group of Finance and Economic Affairs, a job usually assigned to the 
premier.90 Some might argue that this could be proof that economic policies did play a role in Xi consolidating 
power. But, it is important to remember that Li is part of the CYL faction that competes for power against the Gang 
of princelings. The establishment of the CLDCDR appears to be more about power politics than economics. It has 
taken away Premier Li’s biggest source of power. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Data from databank: World Development Indicators. Source: World Bank 
Leadership Qualities 
In exploring whether leadership qualities played a role for both Mao and Xi in consolidating personal 
power, my research mainly focuses on cult of personality. Many authoritarian countries have leaders who possess 
and cultivate a cult of personality. Modern day Russia and Vladimir Putin is just one example. But, perhaps no 
modern leader has ever developed a cult of personality quite like Mao Zedong. During the mid-1960’s Mao’s cult of 
personality was at its apex. The legend of Mao and “Maoism” didn’t just reside in China, however, but spread 
globally. This was largely due to the self-promotion that Mao pushed. China gave arms, money and food to 
countries at a time that millions of Chinese peasants were dying from famine.91 At home in China, Mao already had 
the stature as founder of the PRC. Additionally, the term “Mao Zedong Thought” had been coined in 1943 that 
added to the cult of Mao. During the early 1940s the anthem “The East is Red” was also written: 
 
The East is Red, the sun rises. 
In China a Mao Zedong is born. 
He seeks the people’s happiness. 
He is the people’s Great Savior.92 
 
Mao’s cult of personality really started taking off after 1959, when Lin Biao became Minister of Defense. Lin put 
together the little red book of Mao’s quotes that became published. Lin also propagated the cult of Mao in the PLA, 
much to the chagrin of Luo Jui-ching. Mao’s cult of personality had an important role in completely consolidating 
power in himself. Mao became idolized across the country. Parris Chang writes “The formation of a strong personal 
cult of Mao gradually turned Mao into an institution” the importance Chang notes is that “Other party leaders were 
thus disarmed from opposing or attacking Mao publicly, inasmuch as Mao had become the source of authority and 
correctness and they could not base a claim of legitimacy in opposition to Mao.”93 The mixture of the little red book 
along with songs that idolized Mao played an important role in Mao’s cult of personality. It was a huge advantage 
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for Mao against any opposition that dared to challenge him, or undermine his authority. It also was used as a tool for 
consolidating power in himself. 
Since the death of Mao, China’s leaders have been careful to prevent anyone from developing a cult of 
personality like Mao had done. The horrors of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution continue to haunt 
the CCP. That is why some people believe that when the CCP decides on who the next leader should be, they look 
for someone that is intensely loyal to the Party and not very popular. When Xi Jinping became the appointed heir of 
China, nobody suspected that he would attempt to establish a cult of personality. Xi’s background was as someone 
who always took the middle road, and he had a humble, quiet personality. Additionally, Xi’s father had been a 
liberal reformer. Since Xi has taken over though, there are signs that he has developed a cult of personality not seen 
since Mao. In China people just don’t recognize Xi as their President, but also call him “Papa Xi” or “Big Daddy 
Xi.” An article in the New York Times notes, “Not since Mao dominated the nation with his masterly blend of 
populism, fervor and fear has a Chinese leader commanded so much public awe.”94 And like Mao, Xi has had some 
of his speeches published in a book titled The Governance of China. The book can even be found at most Barnes 
and Noble bookstores in the U.S. Songs also have come out praising Xi, including one that has a similar beginning 
to “The East is Red.”95 There has also been a children’s song praising ‘grandpa Xi.’96 Further evidence of Xi’s 
growing cult of personality is the creation of Xi’s “Little Red App.” It contains Xi’s quotes and a map of where he 
made the quotes. Also contained in the app is a story collection about subjects that Xi has an opinion about.97 Its 
name evokes Mao’s little red book. Another telling sign of Xi’s growing cult of personality is the recent directive by 
authorities telling officials to include lectures about Xi’s speeches at schools.98 The growing popularity of Xi makes 
it difficult for someone to oppose him. China’s premier Li Keqiang appears to be fine with everything that Xi has 
done. And because of Xi’s forceful personality, there is not much Li can do.99 In an interview, China scholar David 
Lampton highlights that Xi is popular saying, “One limitation on these ‘loser’ groups acting on their fears and 
resentments is that Xi is apparently popular with the public. This presumably makes potential enemies hesitant to 
confront him.”100 Xi’s developing cult of personality and popularity has helped him consolidate power in himself. 
The long history of strong leaders in China is emphasized by Ross Terrill who wrote, “It was very hard, Mao said, 
for the Chinese people to get out from under thousands of years of worship of the emperor. Indeed. And hard, 
perhaps, for even a Marxist Chinese ruler to dispense with it.”101 Maybe that still holds true today. The Chinese 
people want a strong leader, not a government led by a small group of indistinguishable men.  
In talking about leadership qualities, it’s also worth mentioning something else that both Mao and Xi have 
in common: a knack for keeping the rest of the CCP leadership off-balance. Mao was notorious for keeping the rest 
of the leadership guessing as to what he might approve or disapprove. Xi appears to have picked up on that. In an 
interview with the New York Times Christopher Johnson notes, “It strikes me that nobody knows entirely what’s on 
the mind of Xi Jinping. I think he likes it that way.” Johnson also goes on to say that, “He likes keeping everyone off 
balance. You see it in the way he gives a new policy speech practically once a week, and keeps everyone guessing 
and running to keep up.”102 What this means for China and the world is that events might suddenly occur in a 
whiplash manner that comes unexpectedly. One area where this is already happening is in the South China Sea and 
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East China Sea. When China announced the establishment of ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone) at the end of 
2013—which overlapped with Japanese territorial airspace—it came as a surprise. It also looked like a rash decision 
made by Xi. More of these kind of actions could occur in the future.     
People’s Liberation Army 
Since the founding of the PRC, the PLA has had the most power of any governmental organization in 
China other than the CCP itself. Defining the role of the PLA in Mao and Xi’s consolidation of power can be 
complicated. My research examines if Mao and Xi had the support of the leading figures in the PLA, and how it 
helped them. For Mao, support from the PLA was critically important for defeating his rivals. When Lin Biao took 
over as Minister of Defense in 1959, the PLA went from potentially being Mao’s biggest problem to his strongest 
base of support. Lin became Mao’s biggest supporter. By indoctrinating the PLA with “Mao Zedong Thought” Lin 
proved his loyalty to Mao. The importance of the PLA to Mao is explained by Parris Chang who writes, 
“Nevertheless, it seems obvious that PLA leaders played a vital role in the victory of Mao and the defeat of his 
opponents in the Plenum; this can be seen from the fact that three marshals of the PLA, Yeh-Chien-ying, Hsu 
Hsiang-chien, and Nieh Jung-chen, were awarded by their promotions to the Politburo."103 That Mao had more 
support from the PLA than any other institution is further demonstrated by Ahn who notes, “To begin with, the 
leadership of the PLA’s top machinery proved to be more amenable to Mao’s ideas and policies than to the 
Party’s.”104 More importantly, Lin increased the power of the PLA within the structure of the CCP. Ken Lieberthal 
explains: 
 
Lin Biao then took a series of initiatives to enhance the role of the PLA in CCP affairs. He quickly began to 
increase the number of Party members in the military, perhaps because that would give him a greater say in 
national CCP affairs. During 1963-5, moreover, he worked to expand the PLA’s organizational 
responsibilities, blurring at some points the boundaries between Party and military.105 
 
In 1965, the PLA further expanded its power by taking over complete control of the Public Security forces.106 
Having control of all the security forces tilted the advantage to Mao in his quest to completely consolidate power in 
himself. Additionally, as noted before, the most vocal opponent to Mao and Lin Biao in the PLA was purged toward 
the end of 1965, just as the Cultural Revolution was getting started.107 The purge of Luo eliminated the one high 
ranking officer in the PLA who did not agree with Mao’s war policies. Mao once said that, “Political power grows 
out of the barrel of a gun;”108 there is no question that Mao held the barrel of the gun in his power struggle with Liu 
and the Party. 
The first job Xi Jinping got after graduating college in 1979 was as an aide to Geng Biao, a senior defense 
official. Geng and Xi’s father were very close, and it’s how Xi got the job.109 It allowed Xi to forge ties with the 
military that he kept even after he left for the countryside in 1982. And before Xi became President, he forged 
relationships with top military officials. You Ji writes that, “His close ties with PLA generals were both personal and 
institutional long before he was chosen as China’s next leader. His friendship with offspring of PLA elders can be 
traced back to the 1950s.”110 Upon becoming China’s leader, Xi has quickly established a command of the PLA that 
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his two predecessors were not able to do.111 Helping Xi is the fact that a large share of princelings are in the PLA, 
making it Xi’s major source of support.112 Of any group or institution, it is the PLA that Xi leans on for advice. 
Willy Lam has noted that the PLA princeling generals act as Xi’s private think tank.113 Since taking power, Xi has 
also used his position as CMC chairman to promote generals that support him.114 Xi understands just how 
imperative it is to have control of the PLA in consolidating power. The establishment of the CNSC, with Xi making 
himself chairman, is further proof that the security forces in China is under Xi’s complete control. At the end of 
2014, further evidence of Xi’s growing power came with the appearance of the “CMC chairman responsibility 
system.” Although its appearance in Chinese media outlets has not been frequent, it is important to consider that it 
was not brought up under Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao. One author describes the importance of it saying: 
 
The current evidence strongly suggests that this concept is another piece of Xi Jinping’s ongoing effort to 
consolidate his leadership power, with specific focus on consolidating his actual control of the PLA during 
a period of both aggressive modernization and political turmoil caused by the anti-corruption campaign.115  
     
By taking over as chairman of the CMC right away, promoting generals that are close to him, and establishing the 
CNSC, Xi has demonstrated that the PLA is a main factor for his consolidation of power. Command of the gun 
oftentimes determines political conflicts and power throughout the world to this day. Both Mao and Xi were able to 
use it as leverage in consolidating power in themselves.  
Corruption 
 Corruption for this article is defined as “the abuse of public office for private gain.”116 Although corruption 
looks different in every country, I mainly focus on the number of Party officials disciplined for corruption, and also 
focus on the high ranking officials that are detained. From 1962 until Mao’s death, the issue of corruption was not a 
significant problem in China. The absence of a market economy can partially explain why this was, but also the 
absolute authority by Mao after 1965 meant that bribes were not as frequent; your status depended on how well you 
adhered to Mao Zedong thought. Purges under Mao did not occur based on corruption, but whether you were 
considered a capitalist-roadster like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping had been. Because of this, I consider corruption 
as a non-factor for the Mao period.   
Since the first day upon becoming general secretary of the CCP, Xi has framed corruption as an existential 
threat to China. Even previous presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have considered corruption as “‘a matter of life 
and death’ for the CCP.”117 The Heritage Foundation ranks China 144th out of 178 countries in a freedom from 
corruption index. Corruption has gotten worse in the last few years. As the chart below shows, China has slipped 
lower in the rankings than countries like Egypt. The day after he was officially introduced as the general secretary, 
Xi acknowledged the importance of corruption saying, “Under the new conditions, our Party faces many severe 
challenges, and there are many pressing problems within the Party that need to be resolved, particularly 
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corruption.”118 Several weeks later, Xi backed up those words with action. The “eight rules” campaign was 
introduced on December 4, 2012. This new initiative by Xi was intended to combat corruption and clean up the 
behavior of CCP officials.119 Openly flaunting one’s wealth would be punished. These new eight rules went into 
effect in January of 2013.120 More importantly, it also signaled the beginning of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. At 
the start, nobody expected this anti-corruption campaign to end up being the most far reaching crackdown since the 
Cultural Revolution. Xi emphasized that the Party should crackdown on both “tigers” and “flies” meaning both high 
and lower level officials will be investigated.121 From 1997 to 2012, 550,000 Party officials were indicted for either 
corruption or dereliction of duties.122 But, one report notes that since the end of 2012 until the beginning of 2015, 
“414,000 officials have been disciplined by the party for corruption, and 201,600 have been prosecuted for the 
infraction in court.”123 Those numbers are astonishing compared to the fifteen year period from 1997-2012. They 
also show how far and deep Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has reached. Party officials throughout the country are on 
edge that they might be next. 
 
  
 
Figure 1. Source: Heritage Foundation 
 
Evidence of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign’s success is its reach into the PLA. Xi understands that he needs 
the complete support of the PLA to succeed in being the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao. This was no easy 
task, however, with top military officials still loyal to Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao when Xi assumed power. 
Removing Zhou Yongkang, who was in charge of the overall security forces, was a first step in this direction. 
Furthermore, tackling the generals Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong who both pledged loyalty to Jiang Zemin, and were 
two powerful forces within the PLA, proved to be a major success for Xi. Adding to this, Xi has been able to 
restructure the PLA to his advantage with the help of the anti-corruption campaign. Xi has been just as resolute as 
Mao was that the Party have complete authority over the gun. Elevating allies in the PLA, with help of the anti-
corruption campaign, to top spots has helped Xi cement his grip on power.  
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Figure 4. Source: The Economist 
 
Wang Qishan is perhaps the most feared name in China today. He is also one of the few people Xi Jinping 
trusts. As director of the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI), Wang is Xi Jinping’s right hand 
man. What makes Wang so intimidating is his position as head of the CCDI, which is the most feared and powerful 
department in the CCP. Additionally, Wang knows how to capitalize on his position. An article by The Economist 
noted that, “Fear is Wang Qishan’s favoured weapon As leader of the Communist Party’s most sustained and wide-
ranging anti-corruption campaign in its history, he often urges his investigators to be “‘frightening.’”124 Like Xi, 
Wang is also a senior princeling. This has caused increased suspicion that the anti-corruption campaign is really a 
political tool to oust political rivals. Wang’s loyalty and support of Xi has been important for removing political 
opponents. Although Xi has said that, “Cases will be investigated completely and no leniency will be meted out no 
matter who is involved.”125 So far in the anti-corruption campaign, Xi has taken down five big tigers. All of them are 
considered political rivals. The removal of these officials has greatly helped Xi further expand his authority.  
Furthermore, the one faction in the CCP that has not been affected by the anti-corruption campaign is the princeling 
group that Xi leads. Willy Lam has noted “That Xi and the CCDI are targeting rival factions within the CCP is 
illustrated by the ‘Code on Disciplinary Punishments.’”126 The Code on Disciplinary Punishments are regulations 
warning officials against establishing factions and cliques.127 Doubling down on rival factions enables Xi to further 
weaken his opponents.  
There are immense risks associated with the anti-corruption campaign. If Xi does not take down enough big 
tigers than people will accuse the Party of not trying hard enough to combat corruption. If too many big tigers are 
arrested though, people might point to it as evidence that everyone is corrupt, further delegitimizing the CCP. Xi 
walks a fine line in making the anti-corruption campaign successful without further weakening the CCP. The choice 
to carry out the campaign however, was an easy decision for Xi considering his goals. Framing corruption as a crisis 
situation, and the cornerstone of his first three years in office, has allowed Xi to remove political opponents while 
expanding his personal authority.      
Additional Causal Factors 
In analyzing the historical timeline I constructed, two additional causal factors appeared for both Mao and 
Xi in consolidating power. The first is the creation of organizations. The second is the important role of Mao and of 
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Xi’s wives. I first explain the importance of the creation of organizations, and later, the importance of their wives. 
For Mao, the creation of the Cultural Revolution Group was important because it directed the purges of top Chinese 
officials such as Head of State Liu Shaoqi and General Secretary Deng Xiaoping. As Jung Chang and Jon Halliday 
point out, “At the end of May 1966, Mao set up a new office, the Cultural Revolution Small Group, to help run the 
Purge. Mme Mao headed it for him, with Mao’s former secretary, Chen Boda, its nominal director, and purge 
director Kang Sheng its ‘adviser.’”128 The Cultural Revolution Group eventually became more powerful than the 
Party apparatus itself. Revolutionary committees were established throughout the country after the complete 
destruction of the Party apparatus. In addition to the Cultural Revolution Group, Kang Shang was also important. 
Philip Short explains how the sly former secret police chief became such a valuable tool for Mao writing: 
  
So did Kang Sheng, who became the Chairman’s informant on Deng Xiaoping’s Secretariat. He soon 
showed that he had not forgotten his old tradecraft as secret police chief in Yan’an by setting up a ‘Special 
Case Group’ to investigate what he claimed was covert attempt to promote the rehabilitation of Gang Gao. 
In a chilling foretaste of the tactics Kang would use against Mao’s enemies in the great upheavals that lay 
ahead, thousands of people were interrogated and a senior vice-premier purged on the sole evidence of an 
unpublished historical novel.129 
 
Kang’s background as head of the secret police was a crucial advantage for Mao. Control of internal security is 
critical for complete political control. The reinvention of the PLA under Lin Biao was hugely important for Mao as 
well. As noted previously, Lin increased the power of the PLA within the structure of the CCP. Although it was not 
the creation of a new organization, the powers it acquired under Lin—with Mao’s approval and encouragement—
were new. All these factors were important for Mao in consolidating power. 
Xi Jinping has proven to be more skillful than Mao in creating organizations that give him more power. In 
November of 2013, Xi created two super organizations, the CNSC and CLDCRG, described previously, then placed 
himself as the chairman of both of them.130 China scholar David Lampton describes what Xi Jinping’s goals were in 
establishing the CNSC saying, “In short, Xi is both driving to achieve better policy coordination and greater 
personal control in the system.”131 The CNSC is responsible for overseeing all the external and internal security 
affairs in China. Willy Lam notes the reasons for the establishment of the CNSC saying, “The plenum set up a 
National Security Committee (NSC) to better coordinate the work of functions that range from police and counter–
espionage to the media and foreign affairs.”132 There is some debate about what the CNSC actually does, and is 
responsible for, but there is little disagreement that it is a very powerful instrument vested in Xi. The other 
organization, the CLGCDR, greatly diminished the spotlight of Premier Li Keqiang. Just recently, on July 1, 2015, 
another new national security law came out.133 Xinhua describes it this way “covers a wide spectrum of topics 
including defense, finance, science and technology, culture and religion.”134 But the scope of the law still appears 
vague to many China watchers. Patrick Boehler remarks, “The law addresses purported security threats in areas as 
varied as cyberspace, food supply and religion.”135 Behind all the confusion about the law is the constant 
maneuvering by Xi to completely consolidate power. There is also a possibility that the new law allows Xi a legal 
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cover for his activities.136 Xi, through all of these actions, has proven that establishing new organizations is a vital 
tool for consolidating power. 
Mao and Xi’s wives are the second additional causal factor that was important in their success. Mao began 
to retreat from the spotlight from 1960-1962 because of the GLF. Writers began to publicly criticize Mao’s policies. 
Wu Han and Teng To were two writers specifically that lashed out in the cultural sphere. By the end of 1962, it 
became a growing problem for Mao. In every country, control of the media is considered indispensable for 
controlling power, and Mao had always used the pen as one of his most powerful weapons. This time, Mao 
employed the services of his wife Jiang Qing to try and take back control of the propaganda and culture in China. By 
unleashing Jiang Qing, Mao violated the agreement with the rest of the Party that was put in place when they 
married which barred Jiang from being active in politics. Jiang served as an important pillar of support Mao needed 
to purge his rivals. Harry Harding describes her importance this way, “The second element in the nascent Maoist 
coalition was a group of radical intellectuals who, by mid-1966, would come to serve as the doctrinal arbiters and 
mass mobilizers of the Cultural Revolution. The key person in assembling these leftist propagandists and writers 
was Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing.”137 Jiang also became a leading member of the Cultural Revolution Group (CRG) that 
ran the Cultural Revolution. The CRG eventually became more powerful than the Party apparatus itself. Indeed, 
Jung Chang and Jon Halliday argue that it was Jiang who ran the CRG.138 Li Zhisui summarizes Jiang Qing’s 
importance nicely saying, “But at this turning point in his career, Mao needed Jiang Qing. Even her political 
ambitions were of use. She was, as she claimed, the most loyal lieutenant he had, because without Mao, Jiang Qing 
was no one.”139 How fitting then, that after Mao died, Jiang went on to say that, “I was Chairman Mao’s dog. 
Whoever he told me to bite, I bit.”140   
Peng Liyuan surpassed her husband Xi Jinping in popularity for most of their marriage. Peng was a famous 
folk singer and performer for the PLA. The importance of Peng cannot be overstated in Xi’s rise as the leader of 
China. Because of Peng’s connections in the PLA, she was able to introduce Xi to the Shanghai group—a powerful 
political faction run by former President Jiang Zemin. Willy Lam reports that, “It was Xi’s wife, Peng, who first got 
her husband connected with the Shanghai faction.”141 Without this connection Xi probably would not have gotten 
the job of Party secretary of Zhejiang province that proved to be so important. Later on through his job as Party boss 
of Zhejiang, Xi spent time with Jiang and made a positive impression. Jiang would make sure at the 2007 Party 
Congress that Xi would be designated as the next leader, after President Hu Jintao finished his term in 2012.142 The 
importance of Peng in Xi’s rise is vital to understanding how Xi went from being what Evan Osnos describes as an 
“unremarkable provincial administrator”143 to being the most powerful leader since Mao. Since Xi has become 
President, Peng has continued to help out her husband in a way that the previous two first ladies of China never did. 
Peng has made headlines in China and throughout the world with her fashionable public appearances. Naomi Ng and 
Jun Mai write, “Peng’s clothes are always the talk of the town when she is seen in public, just as Britain’s Kate, the 
Duchess of Cambridge.”144 This approach by Peng is seen as a way for Xi to project soft power throughout the 
world. Whether it has worked, or will work is yet to be determined. Jaime Florcruz remarks that, “Chinese analysts 
think that Peng can similarly help burnish China’s image overseas by projecting a softer touch.”145 Either way, Peng 
continues to play an important role for her husband, which is the first time since Jiang Qing that the wife of China’s 
leader has attempted to do so.  
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Implications 
I finish by examining the possible outcomes in China due to the recent switch back to a strong man rule 
after decades of a consolidated leadership. Before I begin my conclusion, it should be noted that making predictions 
about China is not easy, and the views here are my own. The journalist Rob Gifford spoke of how “China messes 
with my head on a daily basis.”146 I believe that is true of anyone who follows China. One day you think China is 
about to take over the world, and the next day you think it is about to implode. The first possible outcome is that the 
CCP will collapse. This is a growing view among China scholars today, most notably David Shambaugh.147 China’s 
recent economic slowdown might help accelerate the implosion of the CCP. It is widely believed that the legitimacy 
of the CCP over the past three decades has rested on the strong economic growth that Deng Xiaoping started. But 
with that growth slowing, satisfaction with the Party could rapidly disintegrate. Bruce Gilley argues that China will 
eventually democratize. Furthermore, Gilley believes that democratization in China will be led by the political elite 
rather than a revolution from below.148 A move to democratization might be inevitable in the future, even if it is 
from below. As Gifford points out, “but I think that once you allow people to choose their pizza toppings, sooner or 
later they are going to want to choose their political leaders.”149 The Chinese people have more choices today than at 
any point in the past 150 years. Those choices could lead to political changes. The growing gap between rich and 
poor, increasing job losses from State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), environmental problems and social strains is 
evidence that frustration with the Party could build to a tipping point where democratization is a possibility in the 
future. Additionally, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is not popular among all Party officials. Evan Osnos points out 
that, “The struggle between an emperor and his bureaucracy follows a classic pattern in Chinese politics, and it 
rarely ends well for the emperor”.150 Xi’s goal is to keep the Party unified. Additionally, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union still haunts the CCP. Xi Jinping is determined that the CCP leadership understand the lessons from it, and 
why it failed. Naturally, there are those who point to the Soviet Union in explaining that the collapse of the CCP is 
likely. The problem with this analogy should be obvious though. The Soviet Union had a political leader that was 
willing to give up political power. Xi Jinping by contrast, is thus far determined to preserve the CCP, whatever it 
takes.  
Another reason for the possible collapse of the CCP is the absence of an ideology. Under Mao, the CCP 
rested its legitimacy on Marxism. The death of Mao however, sounded the death of Marxism in China. The results 
of that left a moral vacuum in China. Over the past decade the CCP has tried to fill the vacuum with Confucianism, 
but the results have not been great. It is this author’s belief that the Chinese people have found for themselves their 
own ideology: Christianity. The explosion of Christianity over the past three decades is astonishing. Ironically, the 
CCP can use this to its advantage. Chinese people just want to be able to worship without governmental 
interference. A Chinese human rights lawyer, talking about Christians in China with the journalist Evan Osnos said, 
“‘They don’t care who is in power: Caesar, Mao Zedong, the Communist Party’”…“Whoever is in power is in 
power. But don’t hinder my belief in Jesus.”151 The CCP has been able to stay in power since the death of Mao 
because it is able to adapt to new situations. This is a situation that the CCP has a chance to adapt to, and help itself 
stay in power. Part of the reason for the implosion of the CCP however, I believe, is that there is a slight chance Xi 
Jinping could be assassinated. I don’t intend to sound sensational, but when you make a lot of people mad as Xi has 
done with his anti-corruption campaign, there is always an outside possibility of this happening. Additionally, there 
were rumors that Xi was a target of assassination and coup attempts before he took power.   
Second, China will continue to muddle along; it will not become super powerful, but will not collapse 
either. In this scenario China will continue to experience bumps in the economy and in its relationships with foreign 
countries, but no major changes will occur. China will not challenge the U.S. for global superiority, but relations 
will remain tense. Among China scholars, Minxin Pei is most closely associated with this stance. In Pei’s book 
China’s Trapped Transition, he notes China’s refusal to install political reforms might lead to prolonged 
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stagnation.152 Parts of China today are experiencing slow economic growth, while other areas, specifically the 
southern coastal cities, have high growth rates. This contrast throughout will likely continue without reforms of 
China’s SOEs. Finally, Xi Jinping will carry out reforms that enable China to become a superpower. There is a 
possibility that Xi is consolidating power so that he can carry out reforms in the future. Most likely these will be 
economic, but social and political reform are also a possibility. It appears that Xi Jinping is planning on possibly 
holding onto power well past his expected retirement in the year 2023. Willy Lam has written that, “Xi appears to be 
angling to break the 10-year-tenure rule for the country’s supreme leader, with the aim of serving longer than any 
Chinese ruler in decades.”153 There are no indications that Xi is looking for his successor which usually happens 
after a few years in office. It appears that rather than finding his replacement, Xi is maneuvering people into 
positions that will help cement his grip on power which will last for as long as he lives. Xi appears more than up to 
the challenge. One editor of a Chinese paper described Xi this way, “He’s not afraid of Heaven or Earth, and he is, 
as we say, round on the outside, and square on the inside; he looks flexible, but inside he is very hard.”154 Indeed, Xi 
Jinping has a fire inside of him that no Chinese leader has had since Deng Xiaoping. Don’t expect this fire to be 
extinguished anytime soon. Kevin Rudd, the former prime minister of Australia and China scholar who has met Xi 
on several occasions notes that Xi is, “not trying to be something that he’s not. He is a born leader.” Rudd adds, 
“He’s very comfortable with the exercise of power.”155 Xi’s comfort with power is clearly evident throughout his 
three years in power thus far. That power will likely stay with Xi for the rest of his life. Recently, China’s media 
outlets have referred to Xi as China’s ‘core leader.’ This is evidence that Xi has successfully consolidated personal 
power. Chris Buckley writes, “Officials have suggested that hailing Mr. Xi as a leader of such stature—one in the 
footsteps of Deng, who ruled China through its transformation after Mao’s death—carries a warning not to question, 
let alone challenge, his authority as the government navigates turbulent changes.”156 Furthermore, a leading 
magazine of the CCP “has called for conforming with the country’s top leader, Xi Jinping.”157 Going forward, Xi is 
positioned to establish his power and remain influential well past his expected retirement. Additionally, Xi’s aim is 
not to be a great leader, but to be the greatest leader of recent Chinese history.    
Conclusion 
Like Mao before him, Xi has demanded complete loyalty to himself. Both men expect the Party to be 
subservient to their directives; anything less is unacceptable. Both Mao and Xi view themselves as the perfect 
leaders for China, and only through their leadership will China return to its rightful place as the greatest nation and 
civilization.  For both Mao and Xi, control of the PLA and leadership qualities proved important for consolidating 
personal power. The PLA in a way, is a separate institution that has always had a considerable amount of power. 
Any attempt at consolidating power must be accompanied with a control of the PLA. Leadership qualities, mainly 
cult of personality, are also critical. When a leader develops a cult of personality, any potential political opponent 
becomes less likely to challenge the authority of a leader. Developing separate instruments of power to circumvent 
the Party, and the role their wives played were also important additional causal factors for both Mao and Xi. When 
feeling constrained by the CCP system, Mao and Xi created alternative power sources for themselves. The roles of 
Mao and Xi’s wives are often overlooked. Jiang Qing and Peng Liyuan were critical in different ways so that their 
husbands could be successful. More importantly, a key attribute for both Mao and Xi in consolidating power is the 
presence of a crisis situation. For Mao that crisis was the Vietnam War. For Xi Jinping it has been corruption.  
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